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Introduction
The fundamental problem when interpreting Plato’s Crito is how to rec-
oncile two parts of the dialogue that appear to be governed by two, conflict-
ing principles: the first part of the dialogue (Cr 43a-49e) articulates Socrates’ 
commitment to the rule of Reason, the second part of the dialogue (Cr 49e-
54e) articulates Socrates’ commitment to the rule of Law. The apparent conflict 
stems from Socrates’ acquiescence in the face of the Laws: Socrates seems to 
be abandon his previous commitment to Reason and deliberation in favor of 
dogmatic obedience to the law. The apparent problem is solved by recognizing 
the common structure of Reason and Law: both depend upon a principle of 
authority, outside of each, that determines the boundaries only within which 
Reason and Law are possible. Plato’s Crito exemplifies this principle and sug-
gests its implications.
This essay is divided into three parts: Part One features my interpretation 
of Plato’s Crito. Part Two is my discussion some of the relevant scholarship on 
the Crito; I show that nearly all interpreters agree about the fundamental ten-
sion of the dialogue, while misunderstanding its importance. I address only 
those interpretations that significantly influence my own. The third, and final 
part of my paper is Preliminary Conclusions. These conclusions are far more 
speculative than my main argument about the Crito and are intended to indicate 
broader implications and areas for further research. I have included the litera-
ture review primarily for those who wish to situate my interpretation within 
the recent history of Crito scholarship. While I obviously believe that my inter-
pretation is novel and important, I also believe my account of recent scholarship 
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on the Crito is interesting in its own right. Part One includes the full justifica-
tion for my interpretation of Plato’s Crito.
Most interpreters either justify Socrates’ obedience1 to the law or try to 
explain away his apparent dogmatism; in both cases, interpreters are forced to 
reconstruct arguments for why Socrates should or should not remain in prison. 
The very fact that we must reconstruct these arguments is my clue to thinking 
about the fundamental tension in a different way: Why does a man so deep-
ly committed to discursive examination fail to examine when speaking with 
the laws of Athens? The tension is one of competing principles, the principle 
that reason must always be obeyed, and the principle that law must always be 
obeyed. As principles, we should not expect to find any straightforward argu-
ment for them; rather, we should expect the arguments to proceed from them.
Part One: Reason, Law, and Authority
It has been frequently and rightly remarked that the Crito is unique among 
Plato’s dialogues insofar as its primary concern is what Socrates ought to do.2 
Most interpreters assume that Socrates ought to do what seems best to his rea-
son (Cr 46b3-6); thus, most interpretations defend the rationality of obedience 
or disobedience. On my account, it is not at all obvious that Socrates ought to 
do what seems best to his reason. On my account, Socrates does not do what 
seems best to his reason because he does not reason about whether he should 
obey the laws; he simply obeys the laws. Doubtless, this claim seems counter-
intuitive to many; after all, does not Socrates articulate and defend his reasons 
for remaining in prison from 49c to 54c? Is it not the cogency of Socrates’ reasons 
for remaining in prison that have been so thoroughly debated in the scholar-
ship summarized below? My answer to both of these questions is ‘no.’ Perhaps 
counter-intuitively I claim that the reasons for remaining in prison, from Crito 
49c to54c, are not Socrates’ reasons; they are the arguments of the speaking laws 
of Athens.3
1 Here and throughout, I do not intend to imply anything about the so-called “histori-
cal Socrates”, nor about Plato’s relation to such a person. For my purposes, “Socrates” is 
a fictional character created and developed by Plato to represent an ideal philosopher. All 
references to Plato are from the O.C.T. editions; translations are based on Grube / Cooper.
2 See Metcalf 2004, p53; Harte 1999, p130; and Lane 1998: “The Crito is the sole 
Platonic dialogue in which Socrates engages in deliberation. I mean this in the Aristotelian 
sense of deliberating on what to do” (313).
3 I am indebted to my student, Jacob Stump, for bringing this aspect of my own inter-
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In the dramatic setting of Plato’s Crito, Socrates addresses himself in the 
speaking voice of the laws of Athens. Socrates—in the voice of the laws—asks, 
“Tell me, Socrates…Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to 
destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned?” 
(Cr 50a-b) The reasons given for Socrates’ remaining in prison hinge upon this 
question. Over the next four Stephanus pages the laws interrogate Socrates, 
and Grube / Cooper quite rightly set the laws’ arguments in quotation marks 
to indicate the distinction between Socrates and the laws. I simply assume that 
Plato intended this distinction, that if Plato wanted Socrates to give his own rea-
sons for remaining in prison he would have done so. Instead, Plato has Socrates 
conduct an admittedly one-sided conversation with himself where the laws of 
Athens interrogate Socrates exactly as Socrates interrogates the interlocutors 
of Plato’s dialogues.4
The one-sided nature of the discussion between Socrates and the laws of 
Athens is the key to noticing just how passively Socrates accepts the laws’ rea-
sons for remaining in prison. Unlike what Socrates—in other Platonic con-
texts, most notably the beginning of the Crito itself—normally expects of him-
self and his interlocutors, Socrates is disengaged and acquiescent in the face of 
the speaking laws. He simply fails to examine the laws’ arguments. The laws 
give reasons—good ones or bad ones—for Socrates to remain in prison; how-
ever, the Crito is unusual among Plato’s dialogues precisely insofar as Socrates 
does not examine these reasons. We may be able to reconstruct what the results of 
such an examination might have been; but, we cannot deny that Socrates unchar-
acteristically fails to examine. Since the Crito is uniquely concerned with what 
Socrates ought to do, I propose that we take the fundamental question of the 
dialogue as this: should Socrates examine the laws reasons for him to remain in 
prison, or should he simply accept their conclusion? Should Socrates recognize 
the authority of Reason and cross-examine the laws; or should he recognize the 
authority of the speaking Laws and not cross-examine? When posed in this way, 
pretation to my attention.
4 To be clear, I read the Crito as if it included three primary characters: Crito, Socrates 
and the laws of Athens. I assume that Plato contrives to have the laws cross-examine Socrates 
for a reason, just as Plato contrives to have Socrates cross-examine Crito in the beginning of 
the dialogue. I do not assume that the words of Socrates invariably represent Plato’s views, 
nor do I assume that the words of the laws represent Socrates’ views. To merely assume 
that Socrates presents his own reasons in the voice of another is unwarranted neglect of the 
dramatic structure of the dialogue. Had Plato intended Socrates to give his own reasons for 
remaining in prison, then he would have done just this.
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the question of what Socrates ought to do becomes a question of whether or 
not to examine.
We know from the Apology that Socrates was convicted of corrupting the 
youth and not believing in the gods of the city (Ap 24b8-c1).5 Socrates is not sur-
prised that he is convicted, although he seems to consider himself to have been 
acquitted (ἀπoπέφευγα, Ap 36a7,8). Indeed, he not only considers himself in-
nocent, Socrates says that those who convicted him are in the wrong: “And now 
away, I being sentenced to death by you, but those men having been sentenced 
to wickedness and injustice by the truth” (Ap 39b4-6, see also Ap 38c1-2, 39c1-
d9). This is sufficient evidence that it is at least possible that Socrates considered 
his conviction under the laws of Athens unjust. Beyond these specific passages, 
the Apology as a whole must lead us to believe that Socrates considered himself 
innocent of the specific charges brought against him; and, thus that Socrates did 
not agree with the verdict of the Laws in his case. 6 Yet, in his discussion with 
the laws, Socrates rejects even asking whether “the city has done injustice to us, 
and has it incorrectly decided its judgment”.7 My point is only that there is a 
real question over the justice or injustice of Socrates’ obedience to his sentence; 
Socrates would have good reasons to suspect that he has been treated unjustly. 
5 In addition to these specific charges, Socrates address earlier charges out of which 
arose the new charges of Meletus and Anytus. The older charges are that Socrates studies 
the things of the heavens and below the earth and that he makes the weaker argument the 
stronger, teaching others to do the same (Ap 19b4-c1).
6 I believe that the passages I cite from the Apology only serve to emphasize views 
already implicit in the Crito. Assuming that the views of the character ‘Socrates’ are at least 
consistent across the two, the comparison serves to emphasize Socrates’ belief in the injus-
tice of his conviction and penalty. The point is not that Socrates in the Crito really believes 
his punishment unjust; the point is, that the justice or injustice of his punishment is and must 
be a genuine question; one that he fails even to ask, much less answer. Miller 1996 correctly 
points out that “it is far from clear what the conclusions the radical reflection on justice, the 
laws of Athens, and the possibility of therapeutic destructive action will lead to, nonethe-
less, from the Socratic perspective the questions must be raised and pursued” (133). Please 
note that I disagree with Miller about Plato’s answer to these questions.
7 (Cr 50c1-2) This important question is uttered by Socrates as the putative, and implic-
itly rejected, answer to the question of how Socrates should respond to the laws’ arguments 
for remaining in prison. Grube / Cooper translate the same text as follows: “The city 
wronged me, and its decision was not right.” Socrates asks Crito whether he should respond 
to the laws’ interrogation with this response; Crito says that he should; Socrates remains 
silent. My basic point is that this is not an issue about which Socrates should remain silent; 
that he does so prompts the explanation that is this paper.
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Further, Socrates would be right to wonder whether abiding by a potentially 
unjust sentence would itself be unjust.
Kraut 1984 goes so far as to claim that the Laws “concede that Socrates has 
been unjustly treated and wronged by Athens” (28). He takes the implied, af-
firmative response to Cr 50c1-2 and the laws concluding remarks at Cr 54c2-3 
as evidence of the laws’ concession. I doubt that the laws concede as much;8 
nevertheless, I agree with Kraut (and most other interpreters) that the Crito 
only confirms the likelihood that Socrates is treated unjustly and wronged by 
the laws. The crucial question, for my purposes, is whether this likelihood really 
matters for the question of what Socrates ought to do. Since Socrates so clearly 
states that one must never return a wrong for a wrong (Cr 49c10e3), many 
interpreters consider it more or less irrelevant to the question of his escape 
whether Socrates was wronged in his conviction. This way of thinking puts the 
burden of proof on the justice or injustice of Socrates’ potential escape.9 Most 
interpreters take the laws’ arguments against and Crito’s arguments for escape 
as their primary interest. I believe the question of the justice or injustice of 
Socrates’ conviction is very relevant to the question of what Socrates ought to 
do, not because an unjust verdict would justify escape, but because one thing 
Socrates ought to do is to inquire into the possibility that it would be unjust to 
remain in prison.10
8 There is no warrant for any implied, affirmative response to Cr 50c1-2 on the part of 
the laws. On my account, the absence of direct response to the question posed at Cr 50c1-2 
is evidence for the fact that it is, for Socrates, an illegitimate question. If Socrates were 
to ask if the laws were wrong in his case, the laws would (and do) respond that Socrates 
has no right to ask this question (Cr 50e5-7). The passage to which Kraut refers at Cr 54c, 
“ἐαν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ 
ὁμολογίας τε καὶ συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος 
τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ 
σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι,” might support Kraut’s claim, by conceding that escape would 
return wrong for wrong, i.e., that the laws wronged Socrates. However, the hypothetical 
construction (even in the future vivid hypothetical) renders the putative “concession” spec-
ulative at best. The laws say “if you escape, then we will be angry with you;” they do not say 
“if you escape, then you will be returning wrong for wrong.” The participles ἀνταδικήσας 
and ἀντικακουργήσας definitely modify Socrates’ hypothetical escape; however, they 
could easily be construed to be presenting Socrates’ hypothetical reasons for his hypothetical 
escape. The participles do not necessarily express the views of the speaking laws.
9 Allen 1980 is again illustrative: “The Crito supposes that laws may be ill-directed or at 
variance with what is by nature just, and yet still bind to obedience up to the point where 
they require doing of injustice” (111).
10 I suggest that Socrates’ acquiescence to unjust laws could be an act of injustice; 
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 Socrates affirms that “it is never right, neither to do injustice, nor to 
return injustice, nor, even when you are suffering evil, to defend yourself by 
doing evil in return” (Cr 49d7-9). Prior to this, Socrates had established that life 
is not worth living with a soul corrupted by injustice (Cr 47e6-48a2). From 
this, we can infer that the life of the city would not be worth preserving if it had 
done injustice to Socrates.11 Richard Kraut is quite right that “there is no reason 
for [Socrates] to allow the laws to assume without argument that destroying a 
city is always wrong” (Kraut 1984, 44). Yet, Socrates assumes without argument 
that destroying a city is always wrong. Nearly all interpreters of Plato’s Crito en-
deavor to reconstruct the argument that Socrates never makes. I want to draw 
our attention to what Socrates actually does and does not do.
From the moment the laws of Athens begin to speak, Socrates abandons 
inquiry. The Laws ask Socrates many (unanswered) questions, they repeatedly 
implore Socrates to persuade them otherwise (Cr 51b3-4, 51c1, 51e6-52a3), 
and they even explicitly command Socrates to inquire (Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ 
Σώκρατες Cr 51c6). It must strike us as singularly odd that Socrates does not 
answer their questions, does not even attempt to persuade them, and does not 
inquire or examine any of their arguments. At the very end of the dialogue, 
Socrates simply capitulates by saying to Crito, “know well that I seem to hear 
just as the Corybantes seem to hear their flutes: this sound of these arguments 
drones in me and makes me unable to hear the others. But know that if you 
present to me opinions contrary to these, you will speak in vain.”12 Even Allen 
while this may seem counterintuitive, I believe that it is a possibility that Socrates should 
not ignore, but does. In this respect, my view of Socrates differs from my view of Dr. M. 
L. King. I suspect that Dr. King didn’t even consider the possibility that his acceptance of 
unjust punishment could be an act of injustice. The reason is that Dr. King accepted the pos-
sibility of unjust laws, Socrates does not. To be fair, I do not really consider the—perhaps 
important—possibility that Socrates could submit to (genuinely) unjust punishment but 
not thereby commit injustice; see, e.g., Allen 1980. This possibility probably comes down to 
the question of whether not acting could be and is in this case an act of injustice. I maintain 
that Socrates’ remaining in prison is an act of obeying the law and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, an act of not inquiring about what to do. If this “law” were genuinely unjust (on 
Socrates’ view, a mere “pseudo-law”), then obeying it at least could be committing injustice; 
thus, it is imperative that Socrates investigate the matter.
11 This is the gist of Miller’s argument for therapeutic destruction of the laws, see 
Miller 1996, pp130-36.
12 Cr 54d26. For more on this reference to the Corybantes see Harte 1999, pp118-
20, Miller 1996, pp121-2, Lane 1998, p330, Weiss 1998, p6, Polansky 1997, p60, Brown 
1992, p79, Allen 1980, p82, and especially Metcalf 2004, pp40-46. In general, the former 
four interpreters take the reference to indicate Socrates’ potential disagreement with the 
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1980—who claims that Socrates “chose to die rather than escape because he 
was convinced by reasoning that it was right to die and wrong to escape; and 
that reasoning is brought to this conclusion in the speech of the Laws of Ath-
ens” (83)—admits that the “dialogue ends on a note of quiet acceptance, with 
Socrates speaking again in his own voice, affirming the logos of the Laws” (96). 
The question that animates most of the literature is whether Socrates ought 
to “quietly accept” the Laws’ arguments. This is not the question that inter-
ests me. Rather, independent of whether or not Socrates does, doesn’t, should 
or shouldn’t “affirm” the Laws’ arguments, there is no question that he doesn’t 
reach whatever conclusion he does by having examined the strength of the 
Laws’ argument for himself (see Cr 46b3). On the contrary, rather than obeying 
the argument that seems best to his own reasoning (Cr 46b5-6), Socrates obeys 
the Laws without any cross-examination or inquiry. Most remarkably, Socrates 
is unable even to hear any other arguments than those of the Laws.
Allen is right that Socrates “quietly accepts” and “affirms” the argument of 
the laws; with Allen 1980, Bostock 1990, Polansky 1997, and Metcalf 2004 
(and against Harte 1999, Miller 1996, Lane 1998, Weiss 1998) I believe that 
Socrates is right to so affirm. However, I find it extremely hard to accept Allen 
1980 and Polansky 1997’s claim that Socrates comes to this affirmation based 
on his own reasoning. Doubtless, Socrates would have come to such a conclu-
sion if he had investigated the matter; but rather than inquire into or examine 
the arguments for remaining in prison, Socrates merely accepts them. Allen, 
as most others, spends so much effort reconstructing what Socrates would have 
argued, that he, as most others, seems blind to fact that “quite acceptance” is 
hardly rigorous examination. Let me be painfully clear that I side with those 
who support Socrates decision to remain in prison; I believe Socrates was right 
to do what he did. I want to insist, however, that we pay careful attention to 
just what Socrates did and did not do. What Socrates did was to not-examine. 
The potential reasons for and against the decision to remain in prison have 
been thoroughly debated in the literature (perhaps overly so); I am particularly 
interested in the “reasons” for Socrates’ decision not to examine the issue. What 
really deserves our attention now is the fact that all of these reconstructions are 
merely potential reasons because Socrates gives none.13 Again, I believe that the 
laws, while the latter four interpreters take the reference to indicate Socrates’ agreement. 
I believe that Metcalf 2004 should have the final word on this perplexing and important 
reference.
13 Let me set aside, for the moment, the suggestion of Polansky 1997 and Metcalf 2004 
that Socrates’ reasons for remaining in prison are really to be found in the first half of the 
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Laws present good reasons for remaining in prison; I also believe that these rea-
sons are deeply consistent with arguments that Socrates himself presents earlier 
in the dialogue; I do not believe however that Plato gives us any indication that 
Socrates has determined for himself that the reasons presented by the Laws are 
good ones. This lack of argument and inquiry is particularly shocking in light of a 
crucial passage in the middle of the Crito. Socrates says:
We must therefore examine whether we should act in the way 
or not, as not only now but at all times I am the kind of man 
who listens to nothing within me but the argument that on 
reflection seems best to me (Cr 46b).
Socrates invokes this imperative always to inquire in response to Crito’s 
most potent “argument” against remaining in prison.
Interpreters (with the exception of Metcalf 2004) too often underestimate 
the importance of Crito’s speech at Cr 45c5-46a8. I believe that in this passage 
Crito presents five, potentially good reasons for Socrates to escape: (1) not 
to escape is unjust (Cr 45c5-8); (2) not to escape would betray Socrates’ sons 
and his duty as a father (Cr 45c8-d6); (3) not to escape would be to choose the 
easy as opposed to the good and courageous thing to do (Cr 45d6-8); (4) not to 
escape would bring shame upon Socrates and his friends (Cr 45d8-e1); (5) not 
to escape would be an act of cowardice (Cr 45d8-46a4). The first reason alone 
demands Socrates’ consideration, given his instance on never doing injustice 
(Cr 49b3-c12). Yet, Socrates never directly examines any these arguments for escape. 
Crito’s sixth, final, and most potent, “argument” for escape is that the time for 
discussion is over; Socrates must stop deliberating in order to act now, before it 
is too late. As Crito states:
Take counsel with yourself, or rather the time for counsel 
is past and the decision should have been taken, and there is 
no further opportunity [μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι 
ὥρα ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι μία δὲ βουλή], for this whole 
business must be ended tonight [δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι]. If we delay 
now, then it will no longer be possible; it will be too late. 
Let me persuade us on every count, Socrates, and do not act 
otherwise (Cr 46a).
dialogue. In the end my conclusion will look somewhat like these; for the moment, it is 
crucial to notice the dramatic interaction between Socrates and the Laws.
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Crito’s suggestion is less an “argument” than an injunction to stop all argu-
ment in order to act. The subtle juxtaposition of verb tense clearly makes this an 
injunction from temporal or political expediency. The potency of this injunc-
tion is due to its immediate plausibility: it seems that there may be times when 
we must act in the absence of definitive deliberations or arguments. Indeed 
this is one of the primary implications of my interpretation of Plato’s Crito.14 
Permit me to suggest what I take to be obvious: It is the very the very essence 
of political life that we must often act in the absence of definitive reasons for do-
ing so. The point is that in discursive, political arguments there always remains a 
potential objection to consider, a rational but unconvinced dissenter, and whole 
host of relevant, unanswered questions. Thus, any political decision is a decision 
to act in spite of the necessarily unfinished investigation into the reasons for and 
against doing so.
Is it even possible to argue against (or for) the decision that the time for 
argument has passed and action must proceed? If the answer is no (and I believe 
it is), then Socrates’ response to Crito’s injunction must be understood, not 
as an argument, but as a counter-injunction. Crito maintains that the time for 
argument has passed; Socrates maintains that there is no such time. Socrates’ 
response to Crito’s injunction is that it is always best to deliberate prior to ac-
tion (see also Cr 48e4), even presumably if this deliberation forestalls action, 
in this case the action of saving Socrates’ life. Socrates is very explicit that his 
own, competing principle obtains “not only now but always” (οὐ νῦν πρῶτον 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ, Cr 46b4). It is precisely the unqualified and unwavering nature 
of Socrates’ counter-imperative that makes his failure to examine that laws rea-
sons for remaining in prison so conspicuous.
Socrates states the principle—according to which he commits himself al-
ways to examine—with two very different verbs: σκοπέομαι (Cr 46b4) and 
λογίζομαι (Cr 46b6), roughly ‘to inquire’ and ‘to calculate.’ I believe these rep-
resent two very different senses of the concept ‘to reason;’ the former more 
general, the latter more specific. I suggest that the conclusion of Republic VI pro-
vides an adequate articulation of these two different senses of reason, or think-
ing. Inquiry is the general, upward movement of thought toward first principles 
called nous; calculation is the specifically discursive or deliberative argumenta-
tion from first principles called dianoia. I take σκοπέομαι to function like nous 
14 In the end, Socrates agrees with Crito that the time for argumentation has past; 
he disagrees with Crito about what he should do in light of this political necessity. When 
Socrates stops arguing he obeys the speaking laws, not Crito.
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and λογίζομαι to function like dianoia. The demand to inquire more generally 
is not the imperative to reason discursively. Doubtless, some sort of inquiry 
was needed for Socrates to decide not to cross-examine the speaking laws; I 
suggest that this general sort of thinking is at least analogous to nous. The sort of 
thinking that led Socrates to obey without examination was not deliberative or 
discursive examination, dianoia. 15.
The imperative always to obey “what seems best to [his] reasoning 
[λογιζομένῳ]” only functions as an effective counter to Crito’s imperative to 
stop reasoning if we take λογίζομαι as analogous to dianoia, specifically de-
liberative reasoning.16 In this context, the specifically “logical” or discursive as-
pect of Socrates’ unyielding commitment to philosophical examination stands 
in striking contrast to his acquiescence in face of the laws. That is, Socrates’ 
principle always to do what seems best to his reasoning rules-out his absolute 
and unargued obedience to law. Socrates’ counter to Crito’s imperative is deep-
ly consistent with Plato’s Socrates, in general. It should surprise no one that 
Socrates claims always to do what seems best insofar as it is the outcome of dis-
cursive examination. It should surprise everyone that he does not conduct such 
an investigation of the laws’ arguments for remaining in prison.
The most profound problem of the Crito is that when interrogated by the 
Laws, Socrates stops arguing. He never posses so much as a question, much 
less an objection to the Laws.17 Socrates is uncharacteristically silent in his “ac-
ceptance” of the Laws’ arguments. Socrates’ silence is all the more trouble-
some given the evidence that Socrates considered himself innocent and con-
sidered those who legally convicted and sentence him as committing injustice; 
Socrates’ silence is most troublesome because he never addresses any of Crito’s 
five, potentially good arguments for escape. The single most pressing question 
15 The more general sense of reason might be helpfully identified with Socratic elen-
chus, where elenchus—while essentially discursive—is far broader than deductive or 
inductive refutation; for my understanding of Socratic elenchus see [reference omitted for 
Blind Review]; I take my understanding to be generally in line with, for example, Metcalf 
2004, Polansky and Carpenter 2002, Scott 2002. Inquiry and elenchus include ad homimen 
arguments and inquiry into first principles.
16 I assume without argument that dianoia, in Republic VI is more than merely mathe-
matical or strictly deductive reasoning. The downward movement of thought in the Republic 
includes all sorts of discursive argumentation.
17 There is one exception that proves this rule. At 52a5-6 Socrates says “Then if I would 
say ‘On account of what, indeed?’, then in like manner they would justly attack me…” The 
inclusion of δικαίως indicates that Plato never means Socrates’ only question to express 
doubt concerning the justice of the Laws. Cf Brown 1992, p13.
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that demands Socrates’ examination is this: Might it be unjust for Socrates to 
remain in prison? I suggest that we can explain Socrates’ failure to examine 
this question by carefully interpreting the very first words spoken by the laws 
of Athens:
If, as we were planning to run away from here, or whatever 
one should call it, the laws and the state came an confronted 
us and asked: “Tell me, Socrates, what you are intending to 
do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to 
destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you 
are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to 
be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but 
are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?” What 
shall we answer to this and other such arguments? For many 
things could be said, especially by an orator on behalf of the 
law we are destroying, which orders that the judgments of the 
courses shall be carried out (Cr 50a-c, Grube).
Laws would not be laws if they “have no force.” The laws are clearly suggest-
ing, or at least Socrates clearly thinks they are saying that escaping from prison 
would destroy the principle “that the judgments of the courts shall be carried 
out.” Some try to distinguish between a particular judgment of the court and 
the principle that laws ought to be obeyed; however, the text is clear that the law 
in question “orders that the judgments of the courts shall be carried out” (τοῦ 
νόμου ἀπολλυμένου ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας 
εἶναι, Cr 50b7-8). Thus, in addition to asking Socrates whether he wants to de-
stroy the city, the laws effectively demand that they always be obeyed, because 
disobeying them would be to deny the principle of law; or, what amounts to the 
same thing, disobeying a “law” would be to deny that it is a law.
The principle that laws must be obeyed is a meta-law, a law about laws. A 
constitution is a meta-law and it is easy to see how destroying a constitution 
might be to destroy a political community. The meta-law establishes the neces-
sary conditions for the possibility of law in the same way that the principle that 
reason is the best way to proceed establishes the conditions for the possibility of 
discursive inquiry. Understood in this way, the laws’ principle is like Socrates’ 
principle that it is always best to act on the basis the best argument (Cr 46b3-6). 
These principles are alike just insofar as argument and deliberation proceed 
from them; hence, it is hard to imagine any argument for them, or so I shall argue 
next. First, we must note that Socrates explicitly considers and rejects the pos-
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sibility of asking a crucial question immediately concluding the previous cita-
tion: “[s]hall we say in answer, ‘[t]he city has done us injustice and it judgment 
was not right.’ Shall we say that, or what?’ (Cr 50c1-2). While Crito answers 
Socrates in the affirmative, Socrates seems utterly to disregard the question. 
Why? The answer lies in the implicit assumption that the laws are always just, 
just as Socrates must always inquire.
The assumption that the laws are necessarily just is the crucial premise that 
justifies Socrates’ failure to inquire about the justice or injustice of remaining 
in prison. This premise is considered “very dubious” by Bostock 1990. His re-
construction of the premise is as follows: “(i) The law that verdicts should be 
carried out is fundamental to the whole system of laws. Hence (ii) whoever at-
tempts to disobey this law is attempting (for his part) to destroy the whole sys-
tem of laws” (Bostock 1990, 2). Throughout the article, Bostock treats (i), the 
fundamental law, as a particular law; and so, disobeying this particular law would 
be to destroy the laws. Likewise, Kahn 1989 says: “the claim that Socrates in-
tends to destroy the city is plausible only because of the particular law he would 
be violating.” Kahn’s account of this “particular law” is “the law that judgments 
of the court must be carried out” (34-5). Yet, if the “law” that laws ought to be 
obeyed were a particular law, then would not the question remain as to whether 
this particular law is just?
Both Kahn and Bostock never really consider the possibility that intending 
to disobey a verdict would, itself, entail the rejection of the principle of law: 
laws must be obeyed.18 The premise or principle that laws must be obeyed is 
not itself a particular law; it is law about law or a meta-law. Kahn comes closest 
to this realization when, following Allen 1980, he says that “what is at stake is 
not a particular law but the principle of effective legality, any attempt to violate 
this law would imply an attack on the principle of legality and hence on the ex-
istence of the city as a civilized society” (Kahn 1989, 37 emphasis in original). 
According to Kahn the argument for why escape would destroy the city and its 
laws “works effectively…only for the violation of a fundamental principle of 
legality and not for disobedience to any ordinary law” (Kahn 1989, 38). Kahn 
never seems to notice that the “law that judgments of the court must be carried 
out” just is this fundamental principle of legality, and hence it is not a particular 
law.
18 To be fair, Kahn 1989 considers and rejects the idea of total obedience to the law as 
philosophically unsalvageable (39-40). This essay is my attempt to “salvage” the principle 
that law must be obeyed.
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The meta-law, that law must be obeyed, is like the definition of law; more 
precisely, the meta-law articulates the necessary conditions of law.19 Let us as-
sume that it might be unjust for Socrates to remain in prison, based upon the 
likelihood that his conviction and sentence were unjust. There is no doubt that 
Socrates believes that it is always unjust to do injustice, or always wrong to do 
wrong (Cr 48d7-9) because doing wrong harms the soul and, obviously, one 
must not harm one’s soul. Therefore, if Socrates must not obey an unjust “law” 
and if Law must be obeyed, the obvious question is whether an unjust law even 
is a law. The answer must be no. We have two fundamental definitions, (a) laws 
are things one must do, and (b) unjust actions are things one must not do. It fol-
lows that “unjust law” is self-contradictory. An “unjust law”, for Socrates, would 
be something that one must do and must not do, at the same time and in the 
same respect. To grant the possibility of an unjust law is to believe a contradic-
tion. Socrates refusal to believe this contradiction entails that “unjust laws” are 
impossible; 20 therefore, obeying the law will always be best for his soul.
The way in which the principle of effective legality is not an ordinary law is 
directly analogous to the way that the principle always to examine (Cr 46b3-6) is 
not the result of an examination. The Socratic principle that argument is always 
the best way to proceed is not, and cannot be, the result of any straightforward 
argument (Phd 88c-91c, notwithstanding). Likewise, the principle that laws 
must be obeyed is not, and cannot be, any ordinary law. The latter is a law about 
law, or a meta-law; the former is the result of an argument about argument, or 
a meta-argument. The most profound problem of the Crito is thus a case of com-
peting principles: either argument must always be obeyed or law must always 
19 Just as the Socratic principle of examination (Cr 46b3-6) articulates the necessary 
conditions of examination, namely that one ought always examine. Polansky 1997 claims 
that the first half of the dialogue (Cr 43a-48b) “emphasizes the very conditions of philo-
sophical discussion;” it does so by “[defending] against skepticism about the worth of argu-
ment and [justifying] Socrates’ personal commitment to listening to the argument that 
seems best” (60).
20 “The connection of thought between law (νόμος) and justice (δίκη, δίκαιος) is so 
close in Greek that the two concepts are typically thought of a coextensive. Although it is 
logically possible to express in Greek the idea that Socrates could commit injustice by obey-
ing the law, this idea is wholly alien to the way νόμος is conceived not only in the Apology 
and the Crito but in much of Greek thought” (Kahn 1989, 31-2). Myles Burnyeat once said 
that he is not aware of one instance in classical Greek of the notion of “unjust law.” I thank 
Antonis Coumondouros for finding the exception that proves this rule: Aristotle’s Politics 
1282b9-13. My essay provides the sketch of an explanation as to why the notion of “unjust 
laws” was “wholly alien” to Plato and ancient thought, in general.
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be obeyed. The first part of the Crito is premised on the rule of reason; the sec-
ond part of the Crito is premised upon the rule of law. The fundamental problem 
is how to reconcile the dialogue and these two competing principles, how to 
reconcile Socrates’ commitment to examination with his failure to examine.
The first step in solving this problem of competing principles may be to re-
alize that Socrates failure to examine the justice of the laws’ decision in his case 
is entailed by the principle of effective legality. The laws claim that merely to in-
tend to escape would destroy the laws: “Tell me, Socrates, what you are intend-
ing to do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, 
the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned” (Cr 50a8-b2)? 
Given that Socrates undoubtedly believes that one must never commit injustice 
(Cr 49b3-c12), any examination of the possibility of escape entails that the jus-
tice of the laws’ verdict is a question. Such a question entails the rejection of the 
principle of legality, that laws must always be obeyed because they are necessar-
ily just. Thus, the impossibility of “unjust laws” carries enormous explanatory 
power for the fundamental problem of why Socrates never investigates whether 
the laws have done him injustice.
The principle that explains Socrates’ failure to question the justice or in-
justice of his conviction and sentence is none other that the principle that one 
must believe that that the laws are necessarily just (the meta-law); that the laws 
are not necessarily just (the presupposition of any inquiry into the justice of the 
laws) is impossible. To inquire into the justice or injustice of the laws’ decision 
and to accept the principle of effective legality is to believe a contradiction, 
namely that the laws can and cannot be unjust. Socrates indicates the impor-
tance of consistency immediately prior to the introduction of the laws. Indeed, 
consistency provides the very context to the principle that it is always wrong to 
do wrong. Socrates asks Crito:
So the consider very carefully whether we have this view in 
common, and whether you agree, and let this be the basis of 
our deliberation, that neither to do wrong nor to return a 
wrong is ever correct, nor is doing harm in return for harm 
done. Or do you disagree and do not share this view as a basis 
for discussion? (Cr 49d5-9).
Socrates considers this principle the foundation of all deliberation; he says 
that agreement to this is a necessary condition for debate. Indeed, he claims that 
those who accept this principle and those that don’t have nothing in common, 
they have no way to deliberate and are forced to merely disdain one another’s 
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deliberations (Cr 49d2-5). While this principle certainly has moral implications, 
its most important implication here is logical, or perhaps metaphysical. The 
principle to which Socrates insists Crito must agree in order even to begin to 
deliberate is that wrong actions are always wrong actions; or, that one action 
cannot be both wrong and not wrong. Clearly, anyone who rejected the prin-
ciple that wrong actions are wrong would be an impossible interlocutor for 
argumentative deliberation; Socrates would merely disdain such views because 
he would be unable to argue for or against them. The fundamental principle is 
the principle that Crito agree with himself, that he abide by something like the 
principle of non-contradiction.
It is well known that the terminology of deliberative principles is the same 
as the terminology of political rule: ἀρχή and the verb ἄρχω. The principle of 
non-contradiction, the rule of reason and the rule of law are all ἀρχαί. I cannot 
put it less vaguely, nor can I be more convinced that the fundamental principle 
according to which Socrates leads his entire life of deliberation and action is the 
principle of principles, the meta-principle that Socrates ought to be ruled, that 
his life ought to have some principle that guides and orders his soul. In normal 
situations of Socratic examination, Socrates is ruled by the principle articulated 
at Crito 46b: Socrates is the sort of man who obeys nothing but the conclusions 
of what seems to him the best argument. In the exceptional situation, in which 
Socrates stands face-to-face with the speaking laws of Athens, he is ruled by the 
principle that laws must be obeyed because they are necessarily just.
From here, it is a short step to the reconciliation of the first part of the 
dialogue, the rule of reason, with the second part of the dialogue, the rule of 
law. The solution is to see the consistency in being ruled. There must be some 
principle or rule outside discursive examination that establishes that discursive 
examination is the proper way to proceed; there must be some principle or rule 
outside the law that establishes that law ought to be obeyed. Thus, Socrates’ 
“defining commitment” (Metcalf 2004, 59) is to be ruled by reason or law; this 
rule is a principle of authority common to reason and law.
Part Two: Interpretations of the Crito
My attempt to understand the Crito in terms of some fundamental ten-
sion—roughly dividing along the two halves of the dialogue—and a potential 
resolution of this tension is hardly unique. I believe the quantity and quality 
of recent scholarship on the Crito can be explained by a relatively recent turn 
to thinking about the Crito as a whole dialogue. For many years interpreters 
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focused on particular arguments in the Crito—the arguments presented by the 
Laws, or the argument for never doing wrong—or, at best, the consistency 
of these arguments with particular passages in the Apology. More recently, in 
line with broader trends in Plato scholarship, interpreters have focused on the 
whole dialogue as a dialogue; this shift in focus raises new questions and rightly 
demands that interpreters think about the first and the second parts of the dia-
logue together. 
The most useful way to think about the current work on the Crito is, rough-
ly, to separate those interpretations that agree with and support Socrates’ deci-
sion to remain in prison from those that want to explain away Socrates’ osten-
sibly dogmatic obedience to the laws of Athens. If I am right that the central 
tension of the Crito stems from competing principles, the principle of reason 
and the principle of law, then this tension explains the two sorts of interpreta-
tion: some interpreters want Socrates to remain fundamentally committed to 
the rule of reason; these usually explain away Socrates’ ostensible obedience to 
the laws of Athens. Other interpreters want Socrates to remain fundamentally 
committed to the rule of law; these usually explain away any conflict by show-
ing that Socrates is and ought to be reasonably persuaded by the argument for 
remaining in prison, spoken by the laws of Athens.21
21 Metcalf 2004, p37n3 considers this the “common view.” Other representatives of 
this view are Woozley 1979, Woozley 1980, Brown 1992, Bostock 1990, and Kahn 1989; 
these latter two will receive special attention below. In addition, Blyth 1995, Blyth 1996, 
Metcalf 2004, and Polansky 1997 defend similar conclusions for perhaps different reasons. 
Dougal Blyth deserves special mention because he illustrates the weakness of my admittedly 
simplistic schematic. Unlike those who explain away Socrates’ obedience, Blyth 1995 and 
1996 argue that obedience is genuinely warranted in Socrates’ case: “because of his educa-
tion and because of the fact that it would be deliberate, to remove himself unjustly from the 
state’s justice would be (impossibly) to give himself over to his own necessary and justified 
absolute moral self-condemnation. As Socrates puts it, it would be to ‘ruin and maim that 
which becomes better by justice and is destroyed by injustice’ (47d3-5), without which, 
he and Crito have agreed, life is not worth living” (Blyth 1995, 66-7). To this extent, Blyth 
follows the “common view” in maintaining that Socrates does what Reason commands by 
remaining in prison: “the only kind of good which can escape the point of view of the 
law is that of autonomous reason…the interests of the city, depending on the laws, are 
protected by the philosopher’s defence of the authority of law” (Blyth 1996, 13-14). Yet, 
Blyth’s parenthetical remark, “impossibly,” reveals something different about this justifica-
tion of Socrates’ obedience to law. To paraphrase after my own purposes, for Blyth 1995 
Socrates escaping from prison would be tantamount to Socrates, per impossible, denying he 
is Socrates; “Socrates’ capacity to philosophize is not the greatest good for him independent 
of his relations with the city of Athens, with which he could satisfy himself in exile. Phi-
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Miller 1996 is representative of interpretations of the former sort—ones 
that attempts to explain away Socrates’ ostensible obedience because it conflicts 
with his commitment to the rule of reason. According to Miller, Socrates’ own 
view is that the laws may need to be destroyed for the good of the city;22 Socrates 
suppresses this view in favor of presenting the view of the many through the 
oratorical voice of the laws: “Socrates in effect invokes the perspective of the 
many to construct the most intelligible and effective defense possible of the phi-
losopher’s commitment to justice” (Miller 1996, 133-4). Basically, since Crito 
has proven himself unable to understand the genuinely philosophical position, 
Socrates—in the voice of the laws—presents a deception, one “intelligible” to 
Crito and “effective”, and producing long-term benefits. Socrates “suppresses 
inquiry in the short term in order to preserve and even occasion it in the long 
term” (Miller 1996, 134). For Miller, “the Laws proceed precisely as an ‘orator’ 
(50b)…Socrates, in first constructing their oratory, does indeed suppress his 
own very different perspective” (Miller 1996, 133). Thus, for Miller, Socrates’ 
commitment to the rule of Reason is suppressed and Socrates’ ostensible obedi-
ence to the laws of Athens is explained away as a mere oratory.
Miller admits that “the costs of this strategy seem impossibly high: Socrates 
both suppresses inquiry and sacrifices his own life” (Miller 1996, 134). Miller’s 
attempt to mitigate these costs is unsuccessful primarily because he has ignored 
a crucial part of the Crito where Socrates explicitly and clearly articulates his 
principle never to suppress inquiry or examination: Cr 46a-b. I consider Miller 
1996 one of the better attempts to argue for a distinction between the views of 
Socrates and the views of the laws; I take the primary question of the dialogue 
as how to reconcile Socrates’ own view as expressed in one part of the dialogue 
with Socrates’ views implicitly expressed by his failure it examine in another 
part of the dialogue. Miller along with many other interpreters fails to recog-
nize Crito’s genuinely potent “argument” for escape: Crito proclaims that the 
time for argument is at an end and the time for action is at hand (Cr 46a).
losophy too appears to depend upon participation in the common good” (Blyth 1995, 64). 
Where Allen 1980 and others have Socrates choosing to obey the law because this is what 
seems best to his reason (see Cr 46b3-6), Blyth 1995 seems to have Socrates obeying the 
law because he cannot do otherwise. Further, Blyth seems to agree with Miller 1996 et al 
insofar as the laws’ speech is merely a rhetorical remedy to Crito’s philosophical ineptitude 
or “moral pathology” (Blyth 1996, 14): the laws’ “speech is a gift by philosophy to the state, 
tailored to the state’s capacities and needs, but it is not itself philosophy” (Blyth 1996, 17). 
I include Blyth among the latter group primarily due to the fact that he agrees with and 
supports Socrates’ decision to remain in prison.
22 Miller 1996, pp132-3. This possibility is aptly considered by Kraut 1984, pp44-53.
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Another, perhaps more significant interpreter who wants to explain away 
Socrates ostensible obedience is Richard Kraut. Kraut takes the speech of the 
laws far more seriously than do the more recent interpreters. Whereas Miller 
1996 et al argue that the speech of the laws is unphilosophical, authoritarian 
rhetoric, Kraut 1984 argues:
The laws merely insist that when a citizen agrees to obey a 
law, he cannot break his agreement merely because it calls on 
him to suffer injustice. But since agreement is a matter of sat-
isfaction and not mere residence, it is possible for a citizen to 
remain in the city and avoid making an agreement to obey an 
agreement to obey a law that he thinks does him injustice…
if he disobeys, he must do so openly, and when summoned to 
court he must try to persuade the jury that he way right to 
disobey (Kraut 1984, 189).
A representative interpretation defending Socrates’ obedience is Allen 
1980:
The Crito maintains that legal obligation rests essentially nei-
ther on force nor on a set of rules fixed in the nature of things 
or the mind of God. It maintains that fidelity to the legal or-
der is a moral obligation, and of such weight as to require 
Socrates to abide by an unjust sentence of death. This conclu-
sion is defended by argument, an argument which rests on the 
two premises that one ought not return injustice for injustice 
or injury for injury, and that one ought to abide by agree-
ments, given that they are just (111).
Allen’s conclusion depends on the following qualification: “the authority 
of law extends only so far as agreement binds, and though agreement will bind 
to the suffering of injustice, in cannot bind to the doing of it” (112). Thus, for 
Allen, Socrates’ commitment to the rule of Reason requires obedience to the 
law only because obedience to the law does not require Socrates to do injustice.
Most interpreters who argue that the speech of the laws is Socrates’ posi-
tion also fail to recognize the importance of Crito’s final speech and Socrates’ 
response. Unlike Miller, these interpreters do so generally because of a failure 
to recognize the tension and potential conflict between the first and second 
parts of the dialogue. Bostock 1990 is an exemplary article that focuses al-
most exclusively on the latter half of the dialogue. Bostock demonstrates that 
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most contemporary attempts to avoid “authoritarianism” are untenable. While 
I find specific weaknesses in Bostock’s reconstructions of the three main non-
authoritarian readings, I agree with Bostock’s over-all approach and conclusion, 
namely “that the presumed expert is the Laws” and “For that reason, their advice 
must always be treated with the greatest respect” (Bostock 1990, 19-20). Per-
haps the best recent interpretation that focuses exclusively on the latter half of 
the dialogue is Kahn 1989. Kahn demonstrates that there is no textual support 
for a Socratic notion of civil disobedience in the Crito.
Kahn is of particular help in identifying “the real puzzle of the Crito” by 
proving that the laws demand “total obedience” (Kahn 1989, 39-40). Kahn 
rightly notes that the ostensible disclaimer to obey or persuade—the key to 
Kraut 1984’s reading—means only “that Socrates has missed his chance not 
only to persuade the judges of his innocence but also to propose exile instead 
of death.”23 So the real puzzle of the Crito is this: “why [do the laws] seem to 
require total submission to any legal command, a submission that apparently 
excludes the citizen’s prerogative to refuse to perform an unjust act even when 
ordered to do so, when we know from the Apology that this is a prerogative that 
Socrates himself is morally bound to uphold?” With reference to the passage 
where the laws demand total obedience, Kahn wrongly thinks “there is from 
the philosophical point of view no hope of salvaging this passage” (Kahn 1989, 
40). My interpretation supports Kahn’s conclusion that there is no way to make 
the laws demand anything less than total obedience; I do not believe that this is 
a hopeless philosophical position and this paper is my attempt to make sense of 
such a position. The real puzzle is Socrates’ own competing claims for absolute 
obedience to reason and absolute obedience to law. Recognizing this puzzle of 
conflicting principles, the first step in discovering the political philosophy of 
the Crito.
The first sort of interpretation, exemplified by Miller 1996, has the advan-
tage of carefully addressing the dramatic structure of the whole dialogue and 
the potential conflict between Socrates’ commitment to discursive examina-
tion and Socrates’ obedience to law. The second sort of interpretation has the 
advantage of recognizing the seriousness of Socrates’ obedience to law. Two re-
23 Kahn 1989, p40n14. Contrast Kahn’s understanding of the persuade-or-obey doc-
trine with Kraut 1984’s version of the same: “A citizen will be justified in violating an order 
issued to him by his parent-city only if that order is in fact unjust. If the order does him 
an injustice he agreed to accept or risk, then he cannot rightly disobey it. The citizen who 
disobeys his city must, when summoned, persuade a jury that he was right to disobey. But 
if he was right yet fails in his efforts to show this to the jury, he has done no wrong” (68-9).
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cent interpreters, Metcalf 2004 and Polansky 1997 combine these advantages. 
Polansky’s strategy “invites us to reflect upon the deep bond connecting the 
deliberations of individuals and the rule of law in political associations” (52); 
this bond is the “connection of logos and nomos” (52n7). The first half of the 
dialogue (Cr 43a-48b) “emphasizes the very conditions of philosophical discus-
sion;” it does so by “[defending] against skepticism about the worth of argument 
and [justifying] Socrates’ personal commitment to listening to the argument 
that seems best” (Polansky 1997, 60). The second half of the dialogue (Cr 48b-
54e) “is an instantiation of what the first half argues for, the reliance upon the 
best available argument” (Polansky 1997, 67). Following Allen 1980, Polansky 
1997 supports the seriousness of Socrates’ decision to remain in prison because 
“Escaping the pronounced sentence…would be an inexcusable breach of just 
agreement” (67). I follow two main lines of Polansky’s interpretation: a) the 
“appreciation of Socrates’ arguments increases through attention to the whole 
course of the dialogue. Both halves of the argumentation are subtle and truly 
elenctic. Moreover, they fit together” (67). b) “In each half of the dialogue it 
is not so much a particular argument or law that is in question, but rather the 
whole basis and purpose of conversation and political life” (52). I agree with Po-
lansky that we must interpret the dramatic and argumentative structure of both 
halves of the dialogue together; I agree that, read together, the two halves of the 
Crito address “the whole basis” of logos and nomos, Reason and Law. I disagree 
with Polansky about the relative priority of logos over nomos, at least in term of 
the Crito. In other words, I believe that Socrates remains in prison not because it 
would be unjust to do otherwise, but because Socrates recognizes the absolute 
authority of the personified laws.24
24 Hannah Arendt rightly points out: “If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must 
be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments. (The 
authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests nei-
ther on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in 
common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where 
both have their predetermined stable place)” (Arendt 1968b, 93). Polansky 1997 clearly 
has Socrates obey the laws because he has been and ought to have been persuaded by argu-
ments: “The laws have established that Socrates or any thoughtful person has good grounds for 
accepting rule of law and legal procedure” (67, emphasis added). Following Arendt, I am not 
claiming that Socrates obeys the law under coercive force; rather, my thesis demonstrates 
that Socrates accepts a certain hierarchy of authority. This principle of authority obtains 
equally in the spheres of logos and nomos; indeed this principle is the common structure 
underlying both reason and law.
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Metcalf 2004 follows Polansky 1997 (among others) in addressing the 
Crito as a whole dialogue whose second part instantiates the first: “the shame-
argument of the dialogue, reminding Socrates of his rightful subjection to the 
laws, is precisely the articulation of what Socrates means when he vows to be 
persuaded by nothing else of what is his but the logos that appears best to him 
upon reflection [Cr 46b3-6]” (Metcalf 2004, 61-2). Yet, Metcalf convincingly ar-
gues that what gets instantiated or articulated in the second half of the dialogue 
is not the principle of autonomous reason, as Polansky 1997—perhaps despite 
himself—seems to suggest.25 The “shame-argument” is Metcalf’s account of the 
Crito as a whole, wherein Socrates “prompts Crito to regard logos, rather than 
the doxa of the many, as the criterion of what is shameful. Thus, rather than set-
ting aside Crito’s concerns altogether, Socrates transforms their relationship 
to what is shameful (τὸ αἰσχρόν), and thereby accomplishes the Corybantic 
purging that is enacted over the dialogue as a whole” (Metcalf 2004, 50). For 
Metcalf 2004, logos is a criterion of shame just insofar as it is “a test of fidelity to 
one’s defining commitments” (52):
the elenchos [Socrates] practices is not—at least, not first and 
foremost—a matter of refuting opinions or proposed defini-
tions. Rather, it is the refutation of lives that do not live up 
to their defining agreements or commitments. The shame ac-
companying such an existentially-deep elenchos is the shame 
felt at one’s lack of integrity (Metcalf 2004, 53).
25 I say “despite himself ” because Polansky, more than most, is acutely aware that 
Socratic elenchus is not reducible to anything like pure reason or logical refutation; see, e.g., 
Polansky 1985, Polansky and Carpenter 2002 and [reference omitted for Blind Review]. 
Polansky agrees with Metcalf that Socratic elenchus is essentially ad hominem in character. 
Yet, even Polansky may fall victim to what Metcalf calls “the Kantian conception of rational 
autonomy [that] remains so powerful an influence upon interpretations of the Crito” (Met-
calf 2004, 61). Thus, for Polansky, what is instantiated in the second half of the dialogue 
is “the reliance upon the best available argument” not Socrates’ “rightful subjection to the 
laws;” when Polanksy says that “the condition for receiving benefit from the city [is] that one 
accedes to just orders” (Polansky 1997, 64), it is hard not to imagine that he has something 
like autonomous reason in mind as that which determines the justice or injustice of orders 
with recourse to “the best available argument.” On my view, one accedes to the commands 
of the personified laws not because they seem just to one’s reasoning, but because it is the 
laws who command. Nevertheless, the concept of autonomous reason influences Polan-
sky far less than most; especially less than those interpreters who want to explain away 
Socrates’ obedience as a rhetorical ploy, e.g., Miller 1996, Weiss 1998, and Harte 1999.
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Metcalf draws our attention to two points that contribute decisively to my 
interpretation of the Crito: First, Crito’s concerns—while overly respectful of 
the opinions of the many—are far too serious to be simply set aside or sophisti-
cally assuaged.26 Metcalf is nearly alone among interpreters (excepting perhaps 
Blyth 1995 and 1996) to recognize the potency of Crito’s arguments, especially 
from Cr 45c1-46a8. Second, what are really at stake in the Crito are the funda-
mental principles from which all deliberation and action proceed:
Socrates is being shown the unliveability of the life he would 
have spared for himself by escaping into exile. This delibera-
tive instance of elenchos, like all forms of elenchos, is essentially 
ad hominem, for the life in exile is shown to be unliveable in 
light of Socrates’ defining commitments, e.g., his commit-
ment to Athens, his commitment to philosophy, his commit-
ment to his friends and family, his commitment to himself as 
someone who is distinguished by the peculiar excellence of 
soul, and in general his commitment to living well rather than 
simply staying alive (Metcalf 2004, 59).
26 “The sense of shame that reminds [Socrates] of his subjection to the laws is not 
merely an ‘external’ matter of conforming his conduct to the expectations of the hoi pol-
loi, nor is it entirely indifferent to Crito’s concerns about the ‘unmanliness’ with which 
Socrates appears to have acted, or about matters of reputation and the upbringing of his 
children, etc” (Metcalf 2004, 60). Cf. Blyth 1995, p58. Polansky 1997 touches upon, but 
never develops, the interpretation of Crito’s objections that I develop below. Polansky rec-
ognizes that Crito’s final “argument” is really an injunction that argument is no longer an 
appropriate means of answering their questions; for Polansky this is a form of “skepticism” 
(55). Polanksy rightly says: “What we have here is some indication of the limit of argumen-
tation. There are inevitably problems with grounding reliance upon argument in argument.” 
Polansky naively continues “But if it is agreed that the soul is really crucial and that some 
conditions of the soul are superior to others and that some arguments contribute to these 
better conditions, then argument can defend itself and Socrates must adhere to this argu-
ment in the face of any temptations to do otherwise” (Polansky 1997, 60). Fair enough; 
what Polansky does not see is that the real potency of Crito’s objections is to challenge 
the antecedents of Polanky’s conditional statement on non-argumentative grounds. The real 
potency of Crito’s final “arguments” is that he clearly suggests that certain circumstances may 
require that we end deliberation prior to definitive conclusion; thus, in principle no delib-
eration is capable of arguing that the present ones are not such circumstances. What Plato is 
invoking through Crito’s objection is the principle of authority: someone must decide on the 
limits of argument in order for argumentation to be meaningful at all.
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These defining commitments or fundamental principles are not general, 
legal theory under which Socrates’ particular case is subsumed.27 Rather, the 
laws address themselves specifically to Socrates and the principles from which 
his life is governed. To paraphrase after my own purposes, the central, defining 
commitment through which all others can be understood is Socrates’ commit-
ment to be ruled, whether by the best argument or by the laws of Athens.
This brief survey of some of the relevant scholarship on the Crito has—al-
beit somewhat artificially—identifies two sorts of interpretations: those which 
argue that Socrates does not and ought not dogmatically obey the laws of Ath-
ens, and those which argue that Socrates ought to obey these laws. Thinking 
about recent work on the Crito in these terms has the advantage of revealing 
a tension between the first half and the second half of the dialogue, a tension 
common to nearly all interpretations. Perhaps most importantly, this schema 
reveals that heretofore the most pressing question of the dialogue has been 
‘What is it reasonable for Socrates to do?’ Some argue that it is reasonable 
not to obey the laws; others argue that it is reasonable to obey the laws. I have 
concluded my survey with Metcalf 2004 because this interpretation points to a 
slightly different question: Who has the authority to determine what is reason-
able?
Preliminary Conclusions
The crucial and unanswered question is “has the city done injustice to 
[Socrates], and has it incorrectly decided its judgment?” (Cr 50c1-2). Crito re-
sponds that it seems so. Rather than answering the question, or arguing that he 
has not been wronged by the city, or even examining the justice of remaining in 
prison, Socrates tells a story about origins, or ἀρχαί. The city and its laws are 
the origin of Socrates (σε ἐγεννήσαμεν, Cr 50d2). In the story the laws speak: 
was not it “on account of us that your father took your mother in marriage and 
begat you?” (Cr 50d2-3). The laws ask Socrates if he finds fault with these mari-
tal laws or with the laws according to which he was nurtured and educated; 
27 Contrast this with Kraut 1984: “Since [Socrates] applauds the speech of the laws, 
he presumably interprets it in a way that leaves room for his principle that one must never 
act unjustly. Therefore, we too ought to look for parts of that speech that open the door to 
justified disobedience. And once we find them, we must see how they can be integrated into 
the rest of the speech to form a consistent theory” (24). With Metcalf, Kahn 1989 finds “the 
argument of the Crito [to be] ad hoc and ad hominem. It is not an argument for obedience 
to law in general: it applies specifically to this man and this law” (35).
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Socrates replies that he finds no fault with these laws, nor with the laws accord-
ing to which he was trained in music and athletics. The laws then ask Socrates:
Since you were born, nurtured and educated, could you pos-
sibly be able to say that your are not first our child and slave, 
both you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is just how 
things are, do you suppose that what is just [τὸ δίκαιον] is 
based upon equality [ἐξ ἴσου] between you and us and that 
whatever we attempt to do to you, do you suppose it just 
[δίκαιον] that you do in return these things to us (Cr 50e5-7)?
The laws claim that their right to destroy Socrates does not give Socrates 
the right to destroy the laws. There is a crucial inequality between the ruler (the 
Laws) and the ruled (Socrates), this, despite the fact that Socrates explicitly 
frames their relationship in terms of agreement.28 In a very important way, this 
inequality is like an inequality suggested by Crito’s pragmatic injunction.
Someone must decide when practical circumstances demand action in the 
absence of definitive deliberation. This is an essentially human decision and it 
cannot be governed by reason because it is a decision to suspend reason, and by 
analogy law. Such an exceptional situation29 requires someone competent to 
decide what counts as the normal situation in which reason and law ought to rule. 
By speaking, the Laws choose or discern what counts as marriage, what count as 
families and children, what counts as nurture and education thereof. While it 
may be very interesting to ponder the way that the laws beget Socrates, what is 
most important for my present purposes is the clear implication that Socrates’ 
very being is “on account of ” the Laws. The argument emphasizes possibility: 
28 It is an interesting question just how Socrates’ “agreement” with the laws is or is 
not like the modern notion of contract-theory. Kahn rightly argues that it is a “mistake” 
to read “into the Crito a contract theory in the classical sense of Hobbes and Rawls” (Kahn 
1989, 30). There is at least this obvious difference between these two notions of agreement: 
Socrates’ contract is not based upon the equality of the contracting parties. In addition, I 
do not want to address here the analogy of parents to political authority and children to 
those ruled. This is perhaps one of the most pervasive and important analogies in political 
philosophy, ancient, modern, or otherwise. This analogy gets at the principle of all political 
philosophy: human nature. Thus for example, John Locke recasts the relationship of parents 
to children in explicitly contractual terms in order to abide by the fundamental analogy and 
use it to make contractual government natural, or at least seemingly so. See Locke 1980, 
chapters 6-8.
29 For more on the nature of “the exception” and the corresponding notion of Sover-
eignty, see Schmitt 1985.
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Since Socrates was “born” it is impossible for Socrates “to be able to say that that 
[Socrates] is not” what he is. The Greek emphasizes this argument from pos-
sibility: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου...ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν...ὡς οὐχὶ...ἦσθα. Not only is 
the verb ‘to have’ used with the infinitive to mean ‘be able,’ but the same verb 
is used in the optative with ἄν to designate potential. Thus, a negative response 
to the question clearly implies this: Only because the Laws have first discerned 
what counts as ‘being born’ is it possible for Socrates to say anything; indeed, 
only because the laws have first determined what counts as ‘coming to be’ is it 
possible for Socrates to be what he is, namely an Athenian son and educated man 
worthy of even speaking to the Laws.
For Socrates, some authority must exercise the competence to determine 
the boundaries of the normal situation in which reason and law rule absolutely. 
Socratic philosophy is possible only within these determinate boundaries. Insofar 
as Socrates is the ideal practitioner of philosophical expertise it is impossible for 
him to determine the boundaries of philosophy, because doing so is external to 
Socratic philosophizing. Thus, Socrates accepts the speaking laws as an external 
authority of logos and nomos. By correctly interpreting the first and second parts 
of the Crito, we can see that Socrates commits himself to doing nothing outside 
of these rules; this is Socrates’ commitment to the absolute rule of reason and 
law. Some authority must determine the boundaries of these rules. This au-
thority—essentially external to reason and law—is most clearly exemplified 
by the personification of the laws in the Crito. The fact that the laws speak makes 
these laws essentially different from actual laws. Laws are universal, just as de-
liberative or discursive reason is universal; as such, laws cannot speak. Speech, 
especially in this case, is the expression of human judgment about particular 
individuals and particular circumstances; to speak is what laws cannot do. It is 
only in virtue of the fact that the laws do render judgment about whether Socrates 
counts as a member of the political community that makes them deserving of 
the absolute obedience that Socrates offers. If these laws did not speak, then 
their being just would be a legitimate and necessary question; this would be a 
question as to whether the “laws” of Athens are really the laws of Athens. Yet, 
since the laws do speak, there is no question about their authority or justice. 
Plato nowhere suggests that the laws of Athens are not laws. What it is that is 
speaking to Socrates at the end of the Crito is the laws; as such, they must be 
obeyed. Moreover, it is for just this reason that Socrates explicitly refuses to 
answer the question about their alleged injustice: to do so would be either to 
assert a contradiction, ‘the Laws may not be laws,’ or to reject the definition of 
law. We can clearly see why Socrates would be unwilling to do the former; so 
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why is Socrates unwilling to challenge the definition of law according to which 
to disobey one is to destroy law entire?
This is a particularly difficult question in light of the fact that Socrates spent 
most of his life examining definitions, of justice, of courage, of temperance, 
etc. Socrates refuses to investigate the definition of ‘law’ in this context because 
he is face to face with a living and talking law. I fully grant that in different 
circumstances Socrates would have argued against the definition of law as ‘that 
which must be obeyed’. However, in the presence of particular things that are 
unquestionably laws, Socrates cannot challenge the definition of law because to 
do so would not be merely to deliberate about the essence of law; rather, to do 
so would be to contest the status of this particular thing here, to claim that they 
are incorrectly named ‘laws’. The question of whether this particular thing here 
is or is not a law is a question of an entirely different order than the question 
of what law is.30 This is, however, only to begin an explanation of why Socrates 
merely accepts the definition of law as that which must be obeyed; what cannot 
be denied is that Socrates does just this.
One of Hannah Arendt’s most important insights on authority is that it 
must be in some sense ‘outside’ that over which it has authority (Arendt 1968b, 
97-8, 110-11). The crucial idea is that whatever has authority must rule with-
out recourse to violence or argument. It is true that persuasion by argument 
is what the authority of reason commands at Crito 46b. However, that Socrates 
should be ruled by argument instead of greed, or lust, or whim, cannot be justi-
fied through persuasion or argument. Rather, reason presupposes an authority 
that stands outside reason, the authority that establishes that reason ought to 
rule. It is in just this sense that reason and law are structurally similar: As there 
can be no reason to believe that reason is the best way to proceed, so there can 
be no law that would establish that law should rule. Law requires something 
outside of law both to establish the boundaries within which it applies and to 
make decisions about the application of the law in particular instances. Some 
authority, in the case of reason or law, must decide on the limits of their appli-
cability, or the boundaries only within which can either function. In the Crito, it 
seems to be the speaking laws that exercise this authority.
The dependence on an external authority is the common structural feature 
of reason and law; and, the principle of principles is that Socrates recognizes 
30 I find it most helpful to think of these different “orders” with recourse to the distinc-
tion between metaphysics and epistemology, respectively; my understanding of this distinc-
tion is most indebted to Kripke 1980, pp. 35-49.
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the structural necessity of external authority, an ἀρχή. In the Crito, Socrates 
refuses to question the definition of law because, in the presence of the laws to do 
so would be to claim for himself the authority to define law…this would be 
hubris.
The entire Socratic project depends upon the principle of exteriority: 
there must be something outside of our definitions according to which our 
definitions are true and false, there must be something outside of law to make 
decisions about particular cases; and, most shockingly, there must be something 
outside of reason that authorizes the superiority of reason over force. From this 
perspective of outside, reason and law are remarkably similar: they are internally 
consistent systems of evaluation that are entirely dependent upon some exter-
nal decision about their own limits or conditions. This decision is fundamentally 
political and necessarily human. Plato reveals Socrates’ commitment to this 
principle of authority by contriving a situation, the Crito, in which Socrates is 
simultaneously committed to the rule of reason and the rule of law. The only 
way to understand this contrivance—and not let Socrates’ obedience to law 
contradict his obedience to reason—is to realize that reason and law are alike 
precisely as systems of universal rules essentially dependent upon external au-
thority personified here by the speaking laws. Socrates rightly acquiesces to 
this authority because his philosophical life of inquiry and his political life as a 
citizen of Athens depend upon it.
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